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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UXIVERSITY HEIGHTS, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
P etition.er, 
-vs.-
ST~~TE TAX COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case 
No, 9313 
BRIEF O·F RESPO·NDEN'T 
ST1\TEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a proceeding to review an order and decision 
of the Tax Commission imposing additional corporation 
franchise tax upon petitioner, University Heights, Inc., 
as a result of a disagreement as to the method of deter-
mining the value of the petitioner's corporate franchise. 
The statute imposing the tax provides that it shall 
be equivalent to 4 per cent of the net income of the cor-
poration, or 1/20th of 1 per cent of the fair value during 
the next preceding taxable year of the corporation's tan-
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gible property, whichever is greater. The petitioner de-
termined in the present case that the tax should be paid 
upon the property base and filed its return accordingly. 
The question presented, therefore, is when the tax is paid 
on the property base, whether the fair value of such 
tangible property shall be computed from a determina-
tion made by the county assessor for property tax pur-
poses, or on the other hand should consist of an evaluation 
of the corporate property as determined by the Tax 
Commission, the latter being greater. 
No attempt will be made to defend the constitutional-
ity of Sections 59-5-46 ( 9) and 59-5-1, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as such sections were not considered by the 
Tax Commission in its determination of this matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Tax Commission agrees substantially ''ith the 
facts as set forth by the appellant. Ho,YeYer, in the inter-
ests of clarification and amplification the following brief 
statement is submitted. 
A corporation franchise tax deficiency 'Yas proposed 
against the petitioner for the years 1956, 1957 and 1958. 
The corporation in filing its returns computed the tax on 
the property base arriving at the fair Yalue of its tangi-
ble personal property in Utah by considering the assessed 
value, as determined by the county assessor, to represent 
40 per cent of the fair value of the corporation. The pe-
titioner reported and paid a tax in the amount of $707.79. 
The State Tax Commission refused to accept this meth-
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od of determining the value of the property in question, 
and in lieu thereof the said Tax Commission determined 
the value of said property by reference to depreciated 
book Yalues as shown by the balance sheets on returns 
filed by the taxpayer for the years in question. Thereupon 
the Tax Commission assessed an additional $619.70, plus 
interest in the amount of $59.71. There is no showing 
that the respondent acted in an arbitrary manner in 
making said assessment or that it departed in any \vay 
from standard valuation procedures. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I 
THE TAX COMMISSION IS NOT BOUND BY A 
COUNTY ASSESSOR'S DETERMINATION OF 
VALUE OF PROPERTY FOR PROPERTY TAX 
PURPOSES, BUT MAY PROPERLY MAKE ITS 
OWN DETERMINATION OF FAIR VALUE FOR 
PURPOSES OF THE FRANCHISE TAX. 
PoiNT II 
THE UTAH FRANCHISE TAX IS NOT A 
PROPERTY TAX AND THEREFORE IS NOT 
SUBJECT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL RE-
QUIREMENT OF TAXATION ACCORDING TO 
VALUE. 
ARGU:JIENT 
PoiNT I 
THE TAX COMMISSION IS NOT BOUND BY A 
COUNTY ASSESSOR'S DETERMINATION OF 
VALUE OF PROPERTY FOR PROPERTY TAX 
PURPOSES, BUT MAY PROPERLY MAKE ITS 
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OWN DETERMINATION OF FAIR VALUE FOR 
PURPOSES OF THE FRANCHISE TAX. 
The taxpayer contends that it is proper to use the 
assessed value of property for property tax purposes to 
determine the ''fair value'' of its property for franchise 
tax purposes. In this regard, petitioner contends that the 
Tax Commission is bound to accept the County Assessor's 
determination of "value" for purposes other than which 
it was intended. With this contention the Tax Commis-
sion must respectfully disagree. The Tax Commission is 
not bound to accept any valuation of the County Assessor. 
Section 59-5-47, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that 
the Commission "may of its own iniative order or make 
an assessment or re-assessment of any property which 
it deems to have been over-assessed or under-assessed or 
which it finds has not been assessed.'' The County Asses-
sor is not charged with the duty of determining the Yalue 
of corporate franchises. The Tax Commission alone has 
the responsibility to determine the correct amount of tax 
due. See Section 59-13-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
The Tax Commission alone is empowered to examine the 
taxpayer's records for the purpose of ascertaining the 
correctness of any return. Section 59-13-52, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. In fact, it would be intrepid for the Com-
mission to adopt the petitioner's contentions and to do 
so would be unfair to the petitioner itself. The County 
Assessor by experience and profession is prepared to 
determine the value of property. HowcYer, as will more 
fully appear later, a tax upon the corporate franchise in 
Utah is not a property tax, but rather is a tax upon the 
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privilege of doing business within the state. This is true 
even though the tax be computed upon the property base. 
The Tax Commission maintains an experienced staff, the 
sole function of which is to determine the value of prop-
erty for purposes of the franchise tax. It should be 
apparent that more accurate valuations may be obtained 
by such a staff than could be obtained by following deter-
minations made by a County Assessor motivated by 
entirely different purposes. In fact, because of certain 
pronouncements by the Utah State Supreme Court, the 
Tax Commission could prudently assume no other course. 
In the case of Utah-Idaho Suga.r Co. v. Salt Lake County, 
60 Utah 491, 210 Pac. 106 (1932), Mr. Justice Thurman 
stated in a concurring opinion that a certain tax was an 
income tax and that taxation as a property tax was ex-
cluded ''. . . by the provision of the State Constitution 
(Article 13, ~ 12) which reads as follows : 
'Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to 
prevent the Legislature from providing a stamp 
tax, or a tax based on income, occupation, licenses 
or franchise.' '' 
That opinion continued: 
''From the section just quoted nothing can be 
clearer than that the constitutional convention re-
garded a property tax as one thing and a tax 
based on income as another. The tax on property 
\Yas provided for in the preceding sections of the 
article, wrile a tax based on income was provided 
for as a separate and distinct subject of taxation 
in the section quoted. (As is the franchise tax.) 
With this provision of the Constitution staring 
him in the face, "~hat right or power had the 
assessor of Salt Lake County to assume that the 
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income or earnings from the management of physi-
cal property not reduced to tangible form could 
be assessed as property the same as physical prop-
erty may be assessed~'' 
The court held that the franchise to be a corporation was 
not taxable property under the meaning of the Utah Con-
stitution, Article 13, Section 2 and, therefore, could not 
be assessed in the same manner as tangible property. 
In the case of American Investment Corp. v. State 
Tax Comm. of Utah, 101 Utah 189, 120 P. 2d 331 (1942), 
it was held that the tax imposed by a statute requiring 
corporations annually to pay the state for the privilege of 
exercising its corporate franchise or doing business in 
the state, based on its net income allocated to the state, 
was not a ''property tax'' nor an ''organization tax'' but 
a "tax on the privilege of exercising the corporate fran-
chise,'' or, in other words, on the privilege of doing busi-
ness in the state. The court reiterated this doctrine in the 
case of J. M. & M. S. Browning Co. Y. State Tax Co1n1n., 
107 Utah 457, 153 P. 2d 993 (1945). The court said: 
'' The use of net income allocated to Utah as a 
measure for the amount of tax to be paid by a 
corporation for the privilege of doing business has 
a reasonable common sense basis. The more net 
income realized from doing business in Utah, the 
more valuable the privilege and the higher the 
tax.'' 
See also, EJncrald Oil Co. Y. State Tax Conun., 1 l~tah 2d 
379, 267 P. 2d 77~ (1954). 
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This position is in accord 'vith that taken by the Su-
preme C\n1rt of the United States when it held in the case 
of . -ltla11tic and Pacific Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, Pa., 190 
U.~. 160, 23 S.Ct. 817, 47 L.Ed. 995 (1902), that a corpo-
rate franchise is valuable entirely apart from, or in addi-
tion to, the corporation's other property or assets. 
l\Iodern cases generally sustain this view. In the case 
of Commonwealth v. Ford Motor Co., 350 Pa. 236, 38 A. 
2d 329, App., dismissed 324 U.S. 827, 65 S. Ct. 857, 89 
L.E. 1394, (1944), it was held that being an excise tax, the 
State may fix as a measure of the corporation franchise 
the value of the corporation's property, even property 
'vhich would not ordinarily be amenable to property tax. 
And the California High Court has held that a franchise 
tax differs rna terially from a property tax, as levied for 
state and municipal purposes, in the basis prescribed for 
computing the amount of the tax. America;n. States Water 
Service Co. of California v. Johnson, 31 Cal. App. 2d 606, 
88 P. 2d 770 (1939). 
It is apparent that whether the franchise tax is com-
puted upon the basis of net income or the basis of tangible 
property that it cannot be considered a property tax. 
It should follow that an independent evaluation of proper-
ty for franchise tax purposes should be made. To accept 
petitioner's contentions in this regard is to say that the 
County _i\ ssessor 's determination should also be binding 
in other non-property tax areas, such as the determina-
tion of value for inheritance tax purposes. To rule accord-
ingly is to completely disrupt established procedures. 
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It seems fairly evident from the Utah statutes alone 
that the legislature intended the valuation of corporate 
franchises to be placed on a different basis from the regu-
lar property tax assessment. The Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 59-5-46.1 provides that the State Tax Commis-
sion in cooperation with the various county assessors shall 
make an evaluation of all taxable property in the county 
at least once every five years. However, in regard to cor-
porate franchise taxes, Section 59-13-3 provides in part: 
"Every bank or corporation ... for the privilege 
of exercising its corporate franchise or for the 
privilege of doing business in the state, shall an-
nually pay to the state a tax equal to four per 
cent of its net income for the preceding taxable 
year computed and allocated to this state in a 
manner hereinafter provided, or 1/20th of one per 
cent of the fair value during the next preceding 
taxable year of its tangible property in this state, 
whichever is greater ... " (Emphasis supplied) 
Section 59-3-20(6) (f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, provides : 
"The value of a corporation's tangible property 
for the purpose of this section shall be the arerage 
value of such property during the taxable year." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
It is evident from these statutory provisions that it 
was intended by the legislature that the Yalue of a cor-
porate franchise be determined more often than every 
five years, whereas tangible property need only be re-
evaluated once every five years. It is also apparent that 
a fair and accurate picture of the value of a corporation 
franchise cannot be had by relying on an outmoded figure 
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rPaehed by a County Assessor. Real property values tend 
to remain constant. The value of business property is a 
product of many factors and may fluctuate rapidly. The 
legislature was a'vare of this and provided valuation pro-
cedures accordingly. The Tax Commission should not be 
bound by the County Assessor's determination for non-
property tax purposes. 
PoiNT II 
THE UTAH FRANCHISE TAX IS NOT A 
PROPERTY TAX AND THEREFORE IS NOT 
SUBJECT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL RE-
QUIREMENT OF TAXATION ACCORDING TO 
VALUE. 
Petitioner contends that a franchise tax imposed 
upon the "fair value" of its assets violates the Utah Con-
stitution, Article 13, Section 3. It is contended that the 
addition of the word ''fair'' to modify the value in money 
or cash value standard set by the Utah Constitution is 
unconstitutional and renders the section void. 
Assuming the validity of this argument for property 
tax purposes, it is submitted that petitioner fails to take 
into consideration the fact that there are several consti-
tutional provisions relating to taxation which apply to 
property taxes but not to excise taxes. It is respondent's 
position that Article 13, Section 3, is such a provision. 
In Utah the franchise tax is an excise tax or a privilege 
tax and need not be based on the value of the franchise. 
Indeed, such a franchise tax is not subject to constitu-
tional provisions regarding taxation according to cash 
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value. In Utah the franchise tax is imposed upon the 
privilege of doing business within the state. This propo-
sition and the underlying principles concerned therewith 
is succinctly stated by Cooley in his work on Taxation, 
Volume II, Section 849, pg. 1714: 
''Very often a tax would be unconstitutional and 
void if a 'property' tax while it would be constitu-
tional and valid if in reality an excise. It is nat-
ural, therefore, in such cases, that corporations 
seek to have such taxes declared a property rather 
than an excise tax. If the tax is held to be an excise 
rather than a property tax, it is not subject to the 
constitutional requirement of equality and uni-
formity of taxation, or the requirement of taxation 
according to value.'' 
Section 850 of the same work provides: 
''The constitutional provision that taxation shall 
be according to value applies to property taxes 
and not to excise taxes. It follows that if a tax on 
franchises is a property tax it must be based on the 
value of the franchise, ,,~hile if the tax on fran-
chises is an excise tax it need not be based on their 
value.'' 
The following also furnish support for the above propo-
sition: Phoenix Carpet Co. v. State, 118 Ala. 143, 22 So. 
627, 72 Am. St. Rep. 143 (1897); Kaiser Land & Fruit Co. 
v. Curry, 155 Cal. 638, 103 Pac. 341 (1909): State v. Jlai.ne 
Cen.t. R. Co., 74 Me. 376 (1883) ~State v. TT ... ester11 [Tniou 
Tel. Co., 73 Me. 518 (1882); Standard C"ndergrouud Cable 
v. Attorney r:cncraJ, 46 N.J. Eq. 270, 19 Atl. 733, 19 ..:\._m. 
St. Rep. 394 (1890); Douglas ~4ircraft Co. v. Joli11Son, 13 
Cal. 2d 545, 90 P. 2d 572 (1939) ~Jersey City v. Jlartin, 
10 
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126 N.J.L. 353, 19 Atl. 2d 40 (1941); Annotation 71 
ALR 266. 
As the standard of "value" for purposes of the fran-
ehise tax need not and cannot be the same as "value" for 
property tax purposes and as the constitutional provision 
that taxation shall be according to value does not apply 
to the franchise tax, it should follow that petitioner's 
argument herein must fail. Indeed, this may well be the 
lesson of an early Utah case. In 1908 the Utah Consti-
tution provided: 
"All property in the state, not exempt under the 
lawrs of the United States, or under this constitu-
tion shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be 
ascertained as provided by law. The word 'prop-
erty' as used in this article, is hereby declared to 
include ... franchises ... " 
In construing the then existing constitutional pro-
vision, the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Blackrock 
Copper Jlining & Milling Co. v. Tingey, 34 Utah 369, 98 
Pac. 180, held that the constitutional provision did not 
apply to a license tax on the privilege of existing as a 
corporation as distinguished from a license tax on the 
franchise to carry on a particular business. It had been 
contended that inasmuch as franchises were declared to 
be property by the Constitution that it included all cor-
porate {ra nclz iscs, and therefore no franchise tax could 
be iHzposed except by valuation a;nd assessment by the 
regular method. (Emphasis supplied) The court said: 
"\\T e cannot agree \Yith this contention. To our 
minds it is clear that the legislature did not in-
11 
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tend the license tax imposed by the act in ques-
tion as a property tax notwithstanding that the 
constitution provides, in the section quoted from, 
that franchises are property. Nor did the framers 
of the constitution, in our opinion, intend to limit 
the right of the leglsla ture to impose any other 
than a property tax by valuation upon franchises 
by what is said in Section 2, Article 13. If such 
had been the intention of the framers of that in-
strument, all that was necessary to say was said 
in Section 2 of that article. Why therefore spe-
cially refer to franchises again in Section 12 of the 
same article, and there expressly state that the 
legislature may impose a license tax upon fran-
chises, if it was intended that no tax other than 
a direct valuation tax could be imposed upon cor-
porate franchise~ In our view these two provisions 
are not even conflicting, but if they 'Yere, it would 
be our duty to harmonize them and to giYe each 
one its proper effect so far as possible under the 
rules of construction.'' 
The present- day constitutional provisions haYe 
changed, but it would appear that the Utah Court has 
adopted the rules as stated by Cooley and as set forth in 
Point I, supra. If this is true, then the requirement that 
all property must be assessed at 40 per cent of its Yalue 
does not apply to an assessment for franchise tax pur-
poses. The legislature may fix a different rate for such 
purposes and has in fact done so by the enactment of 
Section 59-13-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. As corporate 
property is not subject to an assessment of 40 per cent 
for franchise tax purposes, it should folio"'" that corporate 
franchise values cannot be determined by subjecting them 
to a faulty and illogical algebraical ratio based on pre-
12 
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determined property tax values. Value for corporation 
franchise tax purposes cannot be obtained by multiplying 
a property tax by t\YO and one-half. It is, therefore, 
apparent that if the Utah franchise tax is not a "prop-
(_lrty'' tax that the tax in itself is not subject to the re-
quirement of taxation according to value and that the 
addition of the word "fair" as found in 59-13-3, Utah 
Code Annotated, cannot possibly constitute a violation 
of the Utah State Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
If "value" for property tax purposes and ''value" 
for purposes of the franchise tax need not be the same, 
it \Yould appear that the various cases interpreting the 
meaning of ''fair value,'' ''actual value,'' ''cash value,'' 
etc., in different contexts, are meaningless in the present 
case. Therefore, assuming the general rules as stated are 
correct, it follows that because the Utah courts have deter-
mined that a franchise tax is not a property tax, it should 
also determine that the constitutional provisions as to 
taxation and assessment of real properties should not 
apply in this area. 
The decision of the Tax Commission should be 
upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General 
F. BURTON HOWARD, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
13 
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